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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY*
DENIS SZABO **
Because of the increasing number of scientific publications, many good books have to
wait as long as three years before being reviewed in the journals. It is significant that
this book, on the contrary, has received several
critical reviews in the few months following its
publication." Why this ultra-critical tone? This
is easily understood after reading Alvin Gouldner's preface, in which he insists that the cards
be laid on the table. The authors' intention is
to break the conspiracy of silence maintained
by generations of criminologists described as
traditional, "by launching a deliberate discourse concerning the general social theory
usually only tacit in specialized work on crime
and deviance" (p. ix) and "by liberating technical 'topics' into a newly enlivening, larger,
more reflexive critique" (p. x). The introduction-it would be more accurate to say the
reintroduction-of criminological studies into
general sociological discussion had to occur
sooner or later. This isn't always a purely theoretical operation. It directly affects criminological practice by emphasizing the necessity of
accepting "the reality of deviance, that has a
capacity to explore its Lebenswelt without becoming the technician of the 'Welfare' State
and its zoo-keepers of deviance" (p. xiv).
After the critical and liberating mission of
the book was announced, the authors then take
* A review article of THE NEw CRIMINOLOGY:
A SociAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE. By Ian Tay-

FOR

lor, Paul Walton and Jock Young. New York:
Harper & Row, 1973. Pp. xiv, 325. $3.95. Because
of the heated debate this controversial work has
provoked, two review articles appear in order to
provide differing perspectives.
**Director, International Centre for Comparative Criminology, University of Montreal.
1 The following book reviews were severely
critical: Beyleveld, Hirst, and Phillipson, 13 BRIT.
J. CRim. 394 (1973); Currie, 9 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 133 (1974); Turk, 3 CONTEMPORARY SoCIOLOGY 217 (1974).

on the difficult task of summarizing and criticizing the corpus of criminological tradition.
The first two chapters constitute the entrance into the subject matter with "Classical
Criminology and the Positivist Revolution."
Beginning with Beccaria, the authors analyse
the positivist reaction which the classical
school of penal law gave rise to at the end of
the 19th century. Continuing on to Lombroso
and Ferri, they proceed to a strong criticism
of contemporary authors whom they situate in
the positivist tradition: Eysenck and Trasler,
among the psychologists; Tappan, Wilkins,
Sellin and Wolfgang among the sociologists.
The connection between the scientific theory and
the social attitudes of the researchers is clearly
shown.
Chapter III, devoted -to Durkheim, is presented as a break with "analytical individualism." In fact, the French sociologist was the
only one, among the outstanding founders of
sociology, to concern himself with an explanation of crime as a social phenomenon which is
part of the total social phenomenon. This first
general theory of the sociology of crime and
deviance, which was at the basis of the structural-functionalist school which dominated
sociology almost until our time is judged insufficient by the authors because, while representing a healthy break with the analytical individualism of the positivists, this was brought
about "at the expense of erecting an
incomplete picture of society, and, in particular, at the expense of ambiguity over the questions of rationality, purposiveness and socialization in divided societies" (p. 90). It is true
that Durkheim was fundamentally a rationalist
and even something of an organicist with his
insistance on the supremacy of the collective
conscience over the individual conscience.
The theoretical breakthrough of Durkheim

BOOK REVIEWS
finally encouraged the development of a series
of sociological studies on criminality, mainly
in the United States. Merton made the most
important contribution in reformulating the
theory of anomie developed by Durkheim in
connection with the etiology of suicide. The
interactionist trend was represented by Sutherland and his disciples as the successors of Durkheim and based itself on the social psychology
of Mead. This trend produced a growing interest dating from the middle of the sixties in the
wake of Albert Cohen; Becker, Kitsuse,
Lemert are examined and criticized.
In the opinion of our authors, all this research lacks a coherent theory of "Deviance."
It does not take into consideration the power
structure and interests. They note that a "relevant theory of deviancy must treat the causal
variables-motivation and reaction-as determinate and as part of a total structure of social
relationships. "[W]e see that the institution of
private property, in a stratified and inequitable
society, divides men from men as owners and
non-owners. It is in the light of this division
that the activities of thieves, police, magistrates
and property-owners become explicable" (p.
170). A whole series of "deviant" conduct, that
of thieves, industrial spies, student rebels, cannot be satisfactorily explained in the interactionist perspective. It lacks, "a detailed social
history of the constraints, aspirations and
meanings which inform and activate the actors" (p. 170). In the same way that the
theory of differential opportunities hardly explains the phenomenon of black militantism, interactionism falls short of an explanation of
behavior caused by global structural data.
Our authors now propose to consider "a structural sociology on the one hand (a sociology
competent to deal with power and interest)
and a sociology of motivation on the other (a
sociology that can account for the way in
which individuals give meaning to their acts)"
(p. 171).
In the chapter given over to American naturalism and phenomenology, the contribution of
ethnomethodology is examined in the work of
Matza. Epistemological concerns naturally
dominate this chapter: what is the exact nature
of the phenomenon called "deviance?" The
writing of Garfinkel, Cicourel, Sacks, etc. are
critically evaluated and our authors conclude

that this sociology of daily life is "to be located within higher order life-plans. It is precisely these normative life-plans, world views,
or ideologies which constitute the cement
which provides the beliefs necessary for the
maintenance of social system . . . .Life is not
a game and only certain beliefs will sustain
specific social systems" (pp. 207-208). Finally,
"the differential availibility of accounts to
members is something which ethnomethodology cannot and does not study, yet it is precisely this problem which is at the basis of the
distribution of motives which inform deviant
behavior. . . .[I]n bracketing away the question of social reality, it does not allow of any
description of the social totality we assert to be
productive of deviance"(p. 208). If the ethnomethodologists renewed the study of norms
and values, the majority have not accepted a
normative sociology.
Chapter VIII is devoted to Marx and Engels and to their disciple Bonger. The task of
the authors is difficult because as they note,
"... one of the most telling features of Marx's
statements on crime is their a-typicality when
compared to -the vast body of orthodox marxism" (p. 219). It is Marx's general theory
which allows us to deduce pertinent conclusions for criminology, rather than his specific
remarks about crime. The following is their interpretation of this general theory: "a full
blown marxist theory of deviance . . . would
be concerned to develop an explanation of the
ways in which particular historical periods,
characterized by particular sets of social relationships and means of production, give rise to
attempts by the economically powerful to order
society in a particular way.... Who makes the
rules and why?" (p. 220). Only such a theory
supports their conclusion "that much deviance
is in itself a political act, and that, in this
sense, deviance is a property of the act rather
than a spurious label applied to the amoral or
the careless by agencies of political and social
control" (p. 221).
At the end of this chapter the authors offer
a Marxist approach to the strategy of criminological research: "It would start with crime
as a human action, as a reaction to positions
held in an antagonistic social structure, but
also as action taken to resolve those antagonisms. It would.., involve a model ... of the
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dialectics of human action, however, or for
whatever reason they tend to be defined as
'criminal' in particular historical periods by the
powerful. .

.

. It would proceed to understand

the relationship of criminal action, and an understanding of its dynamics, to human liberation" (p. 236). Here, then, is the intellectual
unity of the theory of action, the fundamental
aspiration of all socialist thought. Crime results from a conflict between antagonistic
forces, and only by its replacement in the fundamental conflicts which dominate the socioeconomic structure of capitalist societies can a
"correct" analysis of crime take place. Crime
is the expression of the aspirations of the oppressed to contest or to shake off the yoke of
their oppressors.
The last chapter deals with the "new conflict
theorists :" Vold, Dahrendorf, Turk, Quinney,
are placed in a post or neo-marxist perspective.
The authors examine the contribution of this
"school" with sympathy. Nevertheless, they are
still inadequate, according to the demands of
the new criminology. What is wanting is the
most fundamental of the prerequisities of a
general theory: the judicious evaluation of
human conduct. For all of these authors, the
criminal fact, the criminal himself, remains
pathological, while our authors emphasize that
"such a conception undermines or understresses an alternative view of men as purposive
creators and innovators of action" (p. 267).
"The conflict approach is in danger of
withdrawing integrity and purpose--or idiosyncracy-from men: and thus, is close to
erecting a view of crime as a non-purposive
(or pathological) reaction to external circumstances" (p. 267). According to our critics,
everything remains too mechanistic, too deterministic: how does one keep acts and intentions authentic when interests so largely dominate motivation?
What is, then, the theory of the authors?
We have had a foretaste in the quotation of
significant passages of their critique of the
theories of others. Let us examine their own.
For them, "an adequate social theory would
need to be free of the biological and psychological assumptions that have been involved in the
various attempts to explain the actions of the
men who do get defined and sanctioned by the
state as deviant, and react against these defini-
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tions, in different historical circumstances"
(p. 268).
In addition, this theory must take into account "the forms assumed by social control and
deviant action in 'developed' societies characterized . . . by the domination of a capitalist

mode of production, by a division of labour involving the growth of armies of experts, social
workers, psychiatrists and others who had been
assigned a crucial role in the task of social
definition and social control, and currently by
the necessity to segregate out-in mental hospitals, prisons and in juvenile institutions-an
increasing variety of its members as being in
need of control" (p. 269). In a capitalist society, whether balanced by the socialist version
of the Welfare State or not, all social control
is part of the machinery of repression whose
purpose is to maintain public order in the
service of the interests of the governing class.
Resulting from this, all "science" which is
used toward this end has, objectively, an antisocial and repressive function.
Here, then, in some detail, is the approach
suggested by the authors to satisfy the epistemological, methodological and the ontological
demands of the new criminology:
1) "The theory must be able to place an act
in terms of its wider structuralorigins" (p 270).
"The wider origins of the deviant act
could only be understood ...

in terms of the

rapidly changing economic and political contingencies of advanced industrial societies . . . the
formal requirement is . . . a political economy

of crime" (p. 270).
2) "Immediate origins of the deviant act.
The formal requirement . . . is for a social psychology of crime: (which) . . . recognizes that

men may consciously choose the deviant role,
as the one solution to the problem posed by existence in a contradictory society" (p. 271).
3) "The actual act: The formal requirement
...is for an explanation of the ways in which
the actual acts of men are explicable in terms
of rationality of choice or the constraints on
choice at the point of precipitation into action"
(p. 272).
4) "The immediate origins of social reaction: The requirement at this level is for an
explanation of the immediate interaction of the
social audience in terms of range of choices
available to that audience. The requirement ...
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is . . . for a social psychology of social reaction: an account of the contingencies and the
conditions which are crucial to the decisions to
act against the deviant" (pp. 272-273).
5) "Wider original of deviant reaction":
This is concerned with an "effective model of
the political and economic imperatives that underpin on the one hand the 'lay ideologies' and
on the other the 'crusades' and initiatives that
emerge periodically either to control the
amount and the level of deviance or else to remove certain behaviors from the category of
illegal behaviors. We are lacking a political
economy of social reaction" (p. 274).
6) "The outcome of the social reaction on
deviant's further action": The requirement
here is to see "the reaction ... to rejection or
stigmatization... as being bound up with the
conscientious choices that precipitated the initial infraction" (p. 275). "The consciousness
... would be seen as explicable... in terms of
the actor consciousness of the world in general" (p. 276).
7) "The nature of the deviant process as a
whole": All the facts must be present in the
explanation of the facts of deviance, in a complete and dialectical interaction. "The substantive history of twentieth-century criminology
is, by and large, the history of the empirical
emasculation of theories which attempted to
deal with the whole society, and a history
therefore of the depoliticization of criminological issues" (p. 278).
Then new criminology should, therefore, be
"9a political economy of criminal action and of
the reactions it excites, and . . . a politically
informed social psychology of these ongoing
social dynamics" (p. 279). "The new criminology must . . . be a normative theory: it must
hold to the possibilities of a resolution to the
fundamental questions, and a social resolution"
(p. 280).
". .. A criminology which is not normatively committed to the abolition of inequalities
in property and life chances is inevitably
bound to fall into correctionalism. And all
correctionalism is... bound up with the identification of deviance with pathology" (p. 281).
For the authors, "crime is ever and always...
behaviour seen to be problematic within the
framework of those social arrangements: for
crime to be abolished, then, those social ar-

rangements themselves must also be subject to
fundamental social change" (p. 282).
The last paragraph of the book constitutes
the final proclamation of faith: "For us . . .
deviance is normal-in the sense that men are
now consciously involved (in the prisons that
are contemporary society and in the real prisons) in asserting their human diversity ...
The task is to create a society in which the
facts of human diversity, whether personal, organic or social, are not subject to the power to
criminalize" (p. 282).
The preceeding summary is by necessity
schematic, and probably gives only a superficial idea of the richness of the theoretical insights, of the liveliness of the polemical arguments, of the obvious generosity of the moral
inspiration which motivates the authors. I must
say without equivocation that I derived great
pleasure-mixed with a certain irritation and
much uneasiness-in reading this book (twice,
in order to do justice to this review). Taylor,
Walton and Young place themselves in the
iconoclastic tradition of Szasz, Michael and
Adler, and Andreski. Andreski's recent work,
Social Sciences as Sorcery, produced very similar feelings to those I felt when reading the
best parts of the present book, even though the
inspiration of the author stems from the side
opposed to that of the protagonists of the new
criminology. From the start, Taylor, Walton
and Young adopt an ultra-critical position in
considering not only traditional scientific criminology, but equally and perhaps more strongly
in considering other new Marxist trends in
criminology.
I have four main criticisms which I address
to the author: the schematic nature of the argument, the assimilation of theory to ideology,
the less than subtle holism and the utopian
concept of the essential goodness and perfectibility of man. It follows that I recognize in advance my own guilt in the excessive schematization of my critique.
There is nothing strange in the fact that the
critics whom we have quoted have paid the
authors in their own coin: their reaction has
been largely negative. But this reaction is not
based solely on the hyper-critical attitude of
our authors. In undertaking a total re-evaluation of the contribution of criminology to the
contemporary theoretical discourse now taking
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place in the social sciences, the authors have
taken on a perilous task. It is true that criminological writing has been lacking in epistemological criticism, and they do make a distinguished contribution in undertaking the
"sociology of criminology." But even though
not everyone could construct so ambitious an
epistomological study and critique, it still remains extremely schematic and arbitrary in the
eyes of the specialist. Recent reviews of this
book are totally justified in pointing out the
inconsistencies and the simplifications of the
authors in their treatment of such complex
subjects and, in particular, their summary criticism of scientific neutrality. Like all polemicists, they dichotomize arbitrarily, thus lamentably impoverishing the subjects discussed and
giving a false impression of rigor to what is
really only a manifestation of a regrettable intellectual and moral Manichaenism. The same
criticism can be levelled against each chapter:
simplification and distortion of the arguments
of the authors under discussion; large gaps in
the documentation, which is evidenced in the
arbitrary selection of the work criticized; and
a permanent subordination of the finality of
scientific investigation to the finality of normative and political action.
The authors' understanding of history leaves
us perplexed. The ideas of Beccaria, connecting thread of judicial thought till our day, are
treated a-historically. The reference to Angela
Davis is immediate, the political contemporary
context overwhelming. Saleilles analyzes with
subtlety the confrontation between the classical
school of penal law and the growing positivism. The benefit of an understanding of the
historical perspective in which Rousseau, Montesquieu and Beccaria emerged seems scarcely
apparent to our authors. Describing Tarde as a
positivist (p. 17) is akin to describing Sir Karl
Popper or Lord Bertrand Russell as idealists.
One comes upon many of these contradictions,
due to a too rapid, too polemical, too simplistic
treatment of the facts which deserve, and
which have received, more just and nuanced
evaluations.
Let us recall that faith in reason and in science works against the arbitrariness of the
brute force of absolutist regimes. Justified by
an ultramontane theology, obviously teleological, the established system can be called into
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question only by the proclamation of a free examination based on the authority of scientific
research. Conjuring away the depth of the
problems which emerge from a historical analysis, the simplism of the authors contributes little to a serious intellectual debate.
The deficiency which I felt most sharply was
the absence of all reference to criminological
practice and even to a concrete social policy.
The authors' schematic pamphleteering always
remains at such a level of abstraction and generality that none of the proposals appear to be
testable or capable of being put into practice.
As to the final plan proposed, which we have
quoted, who could be against this? Still, when
one gets down to details, one finds much to
disagree with. Vague references to the connections between reformism, liberalism and capitalism cannot be substituted for a rigorous
analysis describing the interaction between the
different scientific ideologies and the socio-political, socio-economic and socio-administrative
reality. This lack of examination of criminal
policy as part of a social policy detracts
greatly from the interest and the scope of the
arguments. An analysis of the relationship between the objectives of the social policy of the
New Deal, the Beveridge Plan, the social democratic governments of the Scandinavian countries, for example, remains to be done. Without such a study, the affirmations of the new
criminologists remain gratuitous and are not
intellectually acceptable.
The confrontation between ideology (because we are really concerned here more with
this than with theory) and practice shows
most vividly the shortcomings in neo-Marxism,
as exemplified by the socio-political, judicial
and criminological reality in the countries with
Marxist-Leninist ideologies. Many works of a
high degree of scientific, intellectual and moral
credibility exist. They allow us to see how the
majority of the theses advanced by the authors
underwent an interesting test in reality since
1917. But where in the index, between the
names of Lemert and Levin, is the name of
Lenin, whose contribution to the theory and
particularly the practice of Marxist justice is
certainly noteworthy? It is not through the
poignant writing of Jackson, Cleaver and others, emerging from the battles of American
minorities and testifying in these writings to
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terrible injustices, that one can understand the
-world described by Solzhenitsyn.
This reduction of the historical perspective
to the smaller perceptions of the generation
who grew up surrounded by the atmosphere of
post-industrial society, of the Vietnam war and
of the decolonization of the Third World, limits this book most severely. Following a wellknown psycho-social mechanism, it will be read
and applauded by those whose experience and
socio-political sensitivity is similar to that of
the authors. Like many other works (the best
example being that of Reich's The Greening
of America) it is the expression of a lightning-flash of the Zeitgeist without attaining
and without contributing to the fundamental
dialogue which man has been pursuing since
the dawn of time.
For those who question the fundamental dialectic between liberty and constraint, order
and change, right and wrong, vice and virtue,
this book is of little help. The authors have been
quoted extensively in order to do justice to their
position. The quotation of several lines from
Burke may be pertinent to their philosophy of
liberty: "Men are qualified for civil liberty in
exact proportion of their disposition to put
moral chain upon their own appetites ...

; so-

ciety cannot exist unless a controlling power
upon will and appetite be placed somewhere,
and less of there is within, the more there is
without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate mind
cannot be free .... "
The vocabulary has no doubt aged; one has
certainly abused the "chains" which willingly
or unwillingly man has imposed or which have
been imposed on the exercise of his liberty. It
still holds true, however, that Burke's principle
merits the greatest attention on the part of
those who are concerned with morality as the
"science" of man.
Those who have chosen "science" in order
to study and understand the deviant or criminal man will be little helped by the propositions of the new criminology. For them, nothing can replace the rigorous process which

consists of testing the ideas and the practices
in a standardized and systematic manner, no
matter what the method or the epistemology
chosen may be.
The division of work between politicians and
scientists, moralists and metaphysicians and betveen bureaucrats and intellectuals was obtained at the cost of great sacrifices, requiring
the imposition of a long catalogue of safeguards. But the direct and immediate subordination of all means to ideological imperatives
has produced 'nothing but socio-political regimes where intolerance reigns supreme and
where it is not easy for free and responsible men
to live. Modern history presents eloquent examples which illustrate these facts. These reminders are in everyone's memory and should certainly be in that of the generation which has.
lived through Watergate.
Finally, those who are concerned with deviancy whether by vocation or by necessity run
the risk of seeing their frusti'ation exacerbated
by this book. The moral conscience of man
does not reduce to a simple reflection of the
political fights of the day. It would be much
too simple to understand and to act on deviant
conduct in terms of ideological engagement
and direct political action. The forces of evil
are truly to be seen at work in history and in
the spirit and in the heart of man. To accept
this fundamental fact of the human condition,
to acknowledge the possibility of defeat as well
that of victory implicit in the very principle of
our liberty of action, is to demonstrate not
only humanity but also humility.
The concrete manner in which man and society react to the triumph of evil obviously
should be subject to constant and watchful
criticism. Here, I think, lies the honour as well
as the vocation of intellectuals: to proclaim the
necessity of such criticism and to practice it
without failure. But to claim the suppression of
constant conflict between good and evil is to
profess an inhuman, arrogant philosophy which
leads to regimes which are tragic to the freedom of man.
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THE "OLD" AND THE "NEW" CRIMINOLOGY*
CHARLES E. REASONS *
"Frankly, I have been quite surprised by the
negative emotional reaction that this book has
received from people that I thought would be
more tolerant in point of view. The discipline
of criminology is not so rich in scholarship
that it cannot benefit from alternative points of
view and perspectives which appear promising." I generally agree with this comment
made by the book review editor in his transmittal of confirmation regarding this review.
The substantive area of criminology has increasingly become politicized with new paradigms
arising
to
challenge
traditional
perspectives.' This has intensified ideological
conflict and increasingly produced heated debates and polemical attacks.2 The New Crimiwology is a significant contribution to the
emerging polemic in criminological circles.
This is not a fault of the work, for polemics or
controversy and dispute are, or should be, a
necessary aspect of science and intellectual affairs. The dialectic of positions and counterpositions stance and opposition is the essence
of a revolutionary perspective of science and
man.

3

While ideology has been important in sociological work in general and criminology specifically, only recently has there emerged a criti* This review article is also a critique of I.
and J. YOUNG, THE NEw
A THEORY OF DEVIANCE

WALTON
TAYLOR, P.
FOR
CRIMINOLOGY:

(1973).
** Associate Professor of Sociology, University
of Calgary.
1 W.

CHAMBLISs,

FUNCTIONAL

AND

CONFLICT

(1974); Reasons, Paradigm
Conflict in Criminology, in CRIME AND DELINTHEORIES OF CRIME

DIMENSIONS OF DEVIANCE (Riedel and
Thornberry, eds., 1975) ; Reasons, The Politicizing
QUENCY:

of Crime, the Criminal and the Criminologist, 64
CRIM. L. & CRIM. 471 (1973).
C. Reasons, THE CRIMINOLOGIST: CRIME AND
THE CRIMINAL (1974); Miller, Ideology and
J.

2

Criminal Justice Policy: Some Current Issues, 64
J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 141 (1973).
3 T. KUHN, THE
REVOLUTIONS (1970).

STRUCTURE

OF

SCIENTIFIC

cal sociology and criminology. The work of the
European Group for the Study of Deviance
and Social Control, and the Union of Radical
Criminologists, among others, portends increasing challenges to traditional studies of de4
viance and crime.
The New Criminology is a product of three
leaders of the European Group for the Study
of Deviance and Social Control and has already elicited a great deal of commentary.
Some have given it fairly supportive reviews,
while others have declared it is a "perversion
of scholarship" and ideological diatribe. 5 While
I am not responding, like some reviewers, to
comments upon my own work, I nonetheless
am in general ideological and substantive
agreement with the authors. Probably the essential significance of this book is noted in the
forward by Alvin Gouldner:
The reorienting power of this work, and it
is a work of power whose achievement does
not depend upon merely marginal distinctions,
derives from its ability to demonstrate that all
studies of crime and deviance, however deeply
entrenched in their own technical traditions,
are inevitably also grounded in larger, more
general social theories which are always present (and consequential) even as unspoken silences. What this important study does, then,
is this: it redirects the total structure of technical discourse concerning "crime" and "deviance," it does this precisely by breaking this
silence, by speaking what is normally unspo-

ken by technicians, by launching a "deliberate
discourse" concerning the general, social
theory usually only tacit in specialized work
in crime and deviance; by exhibiting explicitly
the linkages between technical detail and the
most basic philosophical positions (p. ix).
4 The Union of Radical Criminologists now has
a journal CRIMIE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE published at
Berkeley.
5
See TU, 3 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 217
(1974); Quinney, Rock, and Platt, Feature Review Symposium, 14 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 589 (1973).
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The New Criminology is an invaluable sourcebook for students of deviance and social theorists. It provides many examples of the linkage
between seemingly disparate technical studies
and their philosophical and social underpinnings. However, as shall become evident in the
following discussion of specific chapters, it
would have been more appropriately entitled A
New Look At The Old Criminology.
In their first chapter the authors provide a
good discussion of the philosophical basis of
the classical school of criminology. They note
that the free-will emphasis of the classical
school and the determinism of the positivist
school both withdraw "authenticity" and "rationality" from the criminal act itself (p. 7).
However, during the rest of the work they fail
to explicate "the authentic" approach and the
rationality of crime as David Gordon, among
others, has done." While I agree with the authors that criminality is a continuous trait,
positivistic analysis does set up cut-off points
and typologies based upon more or less criminality. Both Poveda and Chapman have noted
the investment criminologists have in such
distinctions. 7 Chapman observes that:
The social sciences accept the stereotype of
the criminal as a given, for to challenge it
would involve heavy penalties. The penalties
are to be isolated from the main stream of
professional activity, to be denied resources
for research, and to be denied official patronage with its rewards in material and status.
Regarding objectivity the authors state that:
Absolute objectivity becomes an impossible
goal: facts do not speak for themselves.
'Facts' are a product of the work of those
with the power to define what is to be taken
to be factual and of the willingness of those
without such power to accept the given definitions. The social scientist, it follows, makes
choices from various paradigmatic universes;
he chooses to exist in one 'factual' world or
means of production, give rise to attempts by
6 Gordon, Capitalism, Class and Crime i;Ainerica, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 163 (1973).
7 D. CHAPMAN, SOCIOLOGY AND THE STEREOTYPE

(1968) ; Poveda, The Image of
the Criminal: A Critique of Crime and Delinquency Theories, 5 IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 61
(1970).

OF THE CRIMINAL

The implications of this statement are not pursued in their own writing. While the authors
touch upon multiple realities and ideology, they
fail to address such works as Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions, among others, and their significance for the theories and writers they
discuss and the work of "The New Criminologists."
In an excellent discussion of the appeal of
positivism (Chapter 2) they note the ideologi-

cal strengths of positivist thought. In a humanistic vein, the authors assert that man is both
the -product and the producer of society contrary to positivistic assumptions.
In an extensive discussion of Durkheim's

work, the authors make the case for his work
as a break with positivism and "underpinned
not only by a radical critique of individualization but also by a complex (nonpositivistic)
image of man in an ordered society" (p. 71).
For example, in discussing the "normal and
pathological," they suggest that "a flourishing
crime rate, then, is an indication of the anachronistic nature of systems and ideas of social
control" (p. 80). Furthermore, a quite interesting derivation of three types of deviants in
Durkheim's writing are presented: (1) the biological, (2) functional rebel, and (3) skewed.
The biological is evident in the "normal" division of labor while the functional rebel and
skewed deviant are manifest in "pathological"
divisions of labor. The functional rebel, like
Merton's non-conforming deviant,8 challenges
the legitimacy of the existing order, while the
skewed deviant is inappropriately socialized in a
"sick society," i.e., anomie and egoism. Finally,
the authors state that "the most serious conquence of the emasculation of Durkheim's social
theory in the work of many criminologists, has
been the depoliticization of criminology"
(p. 87). This provocative interpretation should
stimulate further research on the classical issues and writers in social theory and their
contemporary "relevance" to social thought
and action.
A chapter entitled "The Early Sociologies of
Crime" provides a critique of Mertonian anomie theory and its subsequent application. It
is suggested that attention to the conformist

8 R. MERTon' and R. NisBET,
SOCIAL PROBLE S (1971).
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adaption would involve the problem of "explaining the legitimacy of authority in an imperfect society" and "it might also confront
Merton with the fact that conforming people
are few and far between in those positions in
the social structure with minimal structural
strain" (p. 98). However, the authors fail to
clarify this point with examples of corporate
crime, political crime and corruption, among
others.
In spite of the many studies of anomie
theory, there is still an aura of mysticism and
reified obstruseness to it.9 Anomie is a form of
mystification which elevates power, politics and
policies and men's action into some reified
force which has descended upon society, i.e.,
anomie. The Chicago ecological work is indicted for its antiseptic, apolitical value-free
approach. Cultural lag, zones of transition, social disorganization, were the "causes" of problems and not the action or inaction of men
competing and in conflict in the day-to-day
game called society, marked by differentials in
power, resources, etc. As the authors' note:
Racism, delinquency, deviation and social problems are not simply the result of the activities
and predispositions of what Gouldner called the
'mopping-up agencies.' they are intimately connected with the problems faced by the 'master
institutions.'
In a chapter analyzing the societal reactionist school, the authors point out that the major
significance of this writing is to demystify cruder structural approaches which fail to appreciate the social control agency as an
independent variable. However, the societal reactionists are criticized for their relativism.
"In the case of premeditated killing for personal gain, however, there is, of course, almost
universal agreement on the deviant label"
(p. 145). Is there really? What of premeditated
killings in war, executions, etc.? The authors
argue that it is clear to most people which actions are deviant and which are not deviant.
However, the contextual, historical variations
in the meaning of deviance suggest this is not
necessarily the case. They fail to distinguish
the broader concept of deviance from the more
-specific concept of crime which contributes
9

M.

,(1964).
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here and elsewhere to problems of interpretation.
Societal reactionists are also criticized for
their lack of humanistic content, allowing for
the deviant to be an actor and creator, not
merely acted upon and created. "For us, in one
sense at least, deviants are always rational
creatures; like any other persons, they engage
in choice and evaluation" (p. 156). This passage along with some others at this point, seem
quite demeaning and somewhat condescending.
It is like, as Jock Yong put it in an earlier article, we as the "Zookeepers of Deviance" are
trying to create a sense of respect and dignity
for these unfortunates while keeping them
"caged" with such terms as deviant and criminal. Why accept the term deviant from the
standpoint of the laws and/or the dominant
moral/political order? Why not look at the deviance and crime of the rich and powerful and
dominant social, economic and political institutions? While they note that the missing element in much of the study of deviance has
been power, they fail to address this in their
seven step model, particularly the nature of
rule-making and the sociology of law.
The chapter dealing with naturalism and
phenomenology is largely a review and critique
of David Matza's work. They note that
Matza's methodological prescription is to "tell
it like it is." It might also be noted that the
methodological prescription for this book is
"be authentic." The authors suggest that the
naturalistic perspective can lead us into the erroneous impression that the only true account
of deviance can be given by deviants. In a positivistic bent they suggest that "[f]alse beliefs
may motivate men but their causal and predictive efficacy must be challenged by the social
theorists" (p. 174). Furthermore,
A considerable amount of deviant action is
falsely-conscious in the sense that it is not
fully conscious of its own constitution. The
false view of society encouraged and propagated by the powerful is one of the constitutive features in the causal chain which encourages acceptance of a set of constraints which
are not in fact necessarily eternal or unchangeable (p. 175).
It would seem, therefore, that we need to look
at the diffusion of conceptions of society, crime
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and criminal motivation and demystify and
correct these to help men change their individual and collective fate. While Matza is criticized for not allowing for the possibility of
"authentic" delinquent accounts, the authors
seem unwilling to allow for deviant interpretations which are "false" and entail false consciousness. Of course, we, the students of deviance, will determine authenticity and false
consciousness. The authors again lapse into an
intellectual paternalism. "Subterranean values
seem to deny the possibility of genuinely deviant values" (p. 187, my emphasis). Who is
to determine their genuineness? Well, at least
we will give this to "them"!
In their discussion of ethnomethodology, the
authors note that they wrote their critique before talking to "insiders," and they subsequently were convinced there "is no necessary
incompatibility between the work in the New
Criminology and the work and discovery of
micro-structural phenomena by ethnomethodologists" (p. 294). Would this have been the
case had they talked to "insiders" from other
ethnomethodiscussing
In
perspectives?
dologists they note a problem: "[n]ow this is a
problem common to all phenomenological inquiry, namely that our objectives in studying
deviance are not the same as those members or
actors whose actions constitute deviance"
(p. 197). Why aren't they? What are our objectives in studying deviance? Why should we
study deviance, particularly that of nuts, sluts,
°
and perverts?1 This issue is important not
only for phenomenologists, but for all students
of society.
In a discussion of Marx and subsequent
"Marxists," they suggest that:
A full-blown Marxist theory of deviance, or
at least a theory of deviance deriving from a
Marxism so described, would be concerned to
develop explanations of the ways in which
particular historical periods, characterized by
particular sets of social relationships and
means of production, give rise to attempts by
the economically and politically powerful to
order society in particular ways ...It would
ask with greater emphasis the question that
Howard Becker poses (and does not face),

lOLiazos, The Sociology of Poverty: Nuts,
Sluts, and Perverts, 20 SocLAL PROBLumS 103
(1972).

namely, who makes the rules, and why? (p.

220).

While the need for sociological analysis of
rule-making is of paramount importance, the
authors largely fail to incorporate significant
socio-legal studies into their work.
In a chapter on "new conflict theorists" they
correctly note that the work of Turk and
Quinney, among others, was largely a response
to more recent events in the U.S. and the inability of existing theories to account for these
events. Might this not also be the case for The
New Ciminology. The conflict theorists are
largely indicted for really being order theorists.
A truly post-capitalist society is not, as in
Darendorf and the new conflict theorists of
deviance, a society in which there is simply a
reorganized plurality of interests or a plurality
of moral values and an ongoing readjustment
of the power they wield: it is a society in
which authority as such is divorced from the
domination of men by men. It is also a society
in which the power to criminalize-if not
abolished-is made subject to a 'genuine,'
rather than simply powerful consensus (p.
252).
How do we arrive at this society? What is
necessary to create such a society with "authentic" relationships and "genuine" consensus? These issues are not addressed substantively in this work and will hopefully be
forthcoming.
In their conclusion the authors begin to outline a basis for the new criminology. It must
be able to cover and connect the wider origins
of the deviant act, immediate origins of the deviant act, the actual act, immediate origins of
social reaction, wider origins of deviant reaction, the outcome of the social reaction on the
deviant's further action, and the nature of the
deviant process as a whole. All of this is
heavily imbued with a sense of the political
economy of deviance in a capitalist society.
These formal requirements of a "truly social
theory of deviance" are given in spacious generalities with few specific substantive examples.
How does this theory relate to the "real world"
of men and action, e.g., Watergate, Northern
Ireland, SLA, FBI, CIA. Wounded Knee, etc.?
While the intellectual discourse is generally
very good and at times brilliant, the relationship
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between the previous chapters and the "new
criminology" seems totally divorced from the
world of men, action, and power.
In conclusion, the authors state that:
We have, in other words, laid claim to have
constructed the formal elements of a theory
that would be adequate to move criminology
out of its own imprisonment in artificially segregated specifics. We have attempted to bring
the parts together again in order to form the
whole (p. 279).
Nonetheless, Chapters 1 - 9 seem almost entirely divorced from Chapter 10, the conclusion. In fact, the conclusion should be the first
chapter in another book entitled The New Criminology. Some glimpses of the role of the
new criminologist and the nature of societal
change necessitated are provided in the authors' final statements:
It should be clear that a criminology which
is not normatively committed to the "abolition
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